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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

29 March 1955

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SUBJECT : NIE 30-55: Middle East Defense Problems and Prospects

1. The attached terms of reference were agreed on at the meeting of the IAC representatives on Monday, 28 March.
2. All agencies are invited to contribute to any section within their competence to do so.
3. It is requested that contributions be received in this office by the close of business on Tuesday, 26 April.

PAUL A. BOREL  
Deputy Assistant Director  
National Estimates

Distribution "B"

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DOCUMENT NO. \_\_\_\_\_  
NO CHANGE IN CLASS. ☐   
☐ DECLASSIFIED  
CLASS. CHANGED TO: TS S C  
NEXT REVIEW DATE: \_\_\_\_\_  
AUTH: HR 70-2  
DATE: \_\_\_\_\_ REVIEWER: \_\_\_\_\_

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## THE PROBLEM

## SCOPE

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Grouping and Probable Consequences of Such a Development," 22 June 1954. Since we consider that much of NIE 30-54 remains valid, the present estimate is designed to supplement rather than to supplant it and is directed primarily toward taking account of the changes in the situation brought about by more recent developments such as the settlement of the Suez dispute, the Iranian oil settlement, the signature of the Turkish-Iraqi agreement, and the deterioration of intra-Arab relations.

I. PRESENT SITUATION

1. How has the situation developed since signature of the Turkish-Pakistani agreement? What has been done to implement the agreement? What has been the effect of the Suez settlement? Of the Iranian oil settlement? What is the significance of the Turkish-Iraqi agreement? What other important steps have been taken in the Middle East defense field? How have the interests and positions of Middle East and other interested states, including the UK and France, been affected in these developments and what role have these states played in them? To what extent has the US been involved, directly or indirectly, in the developments noted?

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above. What new problems and strains affecting the stability and orientation of the area have arisen as a result of these developments?

2. What is the present lineup of forces with respect to Middle East defense and what are the motivations influencing this alignment?

II. What are likely to be future trends in Middle East defense?

1. How far and how fast are Turkey, Pakistan, and Iraq likely to go toward strengthening and consolidating their present arrangements? Toward encouraging the participation of other Middle East states? What obstacles would they face? What practical steps are likely to be taken in these regards?

2. What is the probable course of British policy? What are the prospects for British adherence to regional defense agreements? How active is the UK likely to be in promoting regional defense arrangements? What other steps is the UK likely to take to safeguard base rights and other UK interests?

3. What courses of action are likely to be followed by Egypt? By Saudi Arabia? What is the probable extent, nature, and

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effectiveness of their opposition to the development of northern tier regional defense arrangements? How far are they likely to push their alternative schemes for Arab defense arrangements? On what terms, if any, would they be willing to cooperate in development of Western-inspired defense arrangements? Would these terms be acceptable to the other states involved?

4. What is the prospect for participation in regional defense arrangements by Iran? By the remaining Arab League states? By Afghanistan? How far would this participation go? To what extent are the courses of action of these countries likely to be dictated by external circumstances and pressures? What would be the effect of their exclusion from regional defense arrangements?

5. What are likely to be the attitudes and courses of action of France, India, and other interested states outside the Soviet Bloc?

6. What is the probable extent, nature, and effectiveness of Soviet opposition to the development of regional defense arrangements along present lines? What would be the likely Soviet reaction to the inclusion of Iran in defense arrangements? The inclusion of Afghanistan?

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7. To what extent are US actions likely to affect the development of Middle East defense arrangements? Would the prospects be materially improved, if the US were willing to (a) provide military aid to interested states; (b) participate directly in regional defense arrangements; (c) provide security guarantees; or (d) commit forces to the defense of the area? On what terms would such assistance have to be offered to be effective? What adverse effects might take place as a result of such moves? What would be the effect of US unwillingness to make such moves?

8. In summary, what is the outlook, in both short and longer run for further progress in development of regional defense arrangements, (a) on the political level; (b) on the military level?

III. In the light of the foregoing, how are relations between the Arab states and between them and the West likely to develop?

1. What is the outlook for the power struggle within the Arab League? What are the prospects for a patching up of the present split and on what terms might this take place? What are the chances for a widening of present divisions and what would be

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the effects of such a development? How are the relative strengths of Egypt, Iraq, and Saudi Arabia likely to be affected? What is the probable effect of the power struggle on the positions of Syria, Lebanon, Jordan? On Libya and Yemen?

2. How great is the danger that such states as Egypt and Saudi Arabia might be driven toward neutralism and renewed anti-westernism? How are relations between the various Arab states and the US, the UK, France, Turkey, and Pakistan likely to develop? How and to what extent are existing base agreements and other specific ties likely to be affected? Specifically, how are UK treaty relationships likely to be affected in Jordan, Iraq, the Arabian protectorates?

IV. Briefly, how is the internal stability of individual states likely to affect or to be affected by the above-mentioned developments? More specifically:

1. What is the outlook in Syria? How is the struggle for control of the country likely to develop and with what results? Under what circumstances might Iraq, Egypt, or possibly Turkey intervene openly in Syria? What would be the probable outcome? How and to what extent will the Communists be able to capitalize on the current struggle for power in Syria?

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2. What is the outlook in Egypt? To what extent is the strength and cohesion of the RCC regime bound up with the success of its present policies with respect to Iraq and regional defense? To what extent are developments in the Sudan likely to affect the RCC's attitude toward regional defense?

3. What is the outlook in Iraq? Are significant divisions likely to arise within the country over Middle East defense questions?

4. To what extent might the internal stability of other Middle East states be affected by developments with respect to Middle East defense and related matters?

V. What is Israel's role likely to be in Middle East defense developments? \*

1. How is Israel's assessment of the situation, including its relationship with the US, likely to develop and how are its policies likely to be affected? How great is the danger that Israel might

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\* The questions raised in this section will be covered at greater length in an NIE on "Probable Developments in the Arab-Israeli Situation," also scheduled for Second Quarter 1955 production.



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feel compelled to move toward a policy of military adventurism as a result of defense developments in the area? To what extent is Israeli policy likely to be restrained or mollified by possible US, UK, French, Turkish, and UN actions? By the behavior of its Arab neighbors? On what terms, if any, would Israel be willing to cooperate in development of Western-inspired defense arrangements? Would these terms be acceptable to the other states involved?

2. Are prospective Middle East defense arrangements likely to lead the Arab states to become significantly more reckless or more cautious in their relations with Israel?

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